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I.

INTRODUCTION

This article surveys selected criminal law decisions of the Supreme
Court of Florida and the Florida District Courts of Appeal published between
July 31, 2007 and July 31, 2010. The survey covers cases of first impression, decisions involving or identifying conflicts between the Florida District
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida.
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Courts of Appeal, questions certified to the Supreme Court of Florida as being of great public importance and cases that clarify or expand upon existing
principles of law. It also summarizes an important decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States concerning the punishment of juvenile, nonhomicide offenders in Florida.1 Cases discussing procedural and evidentiary
issues, the death penalty, and Florida's sentencing guidelines are beyond the
scope of this article, which focuses on substantive principles of criminal law.
II.

ASSAULT AND BATTERY

Under section 784.045(l)(a)(2) of the Florida Statutes, aggravated battery occurs when a deadly weapon is used in committing a battery. 2 In Severance v. State,3 the issue was whether the aggravated battery statute requires the defendant to touch the victim with the deadly weapon.4 In this
case, the defendant had choked and hit the victim, threatened to kill her with
a knife, but never touched her with the knife.5 On appeal of his conviction,
he contended that, under Munoz-Perez v. State,6 "the [jury] instruction improperly allowed the jury to convict him of aggravated battery if it found that7
he, while committing the battery, used a knife without touching the victim."
The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed. 8 Receding from MunozPerez, the panel held that "the plain meaning of the aggravated battery statute is that in committing the battery, the defendant used a deadly weapon,
which includes holding a deadly weapon without actually touching the victim with the weapon." 9 In other words, if a deadly weapon is used in any
manner, the battery is aggravated. 10 Affirming the conviction, the court
noted that the absence of any limitations on the manner or method of use of
the deadly weapon means instead that the legislature intended that it cover all

uses. 11

The Florida District Courts of Appeal also reviewed what constitutes a
deadly weapon under both the aggravated battery and aggravated assault

1. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).
2.
3.
4.

FLA. STAT. § 784.045(1)(a)(2) (2010).
972 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (en banc).
Id. at 933.

5. Id. at 932.
6.
7.

942 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
Severance, 972 So. 2d at 933.

8. Id.
9. Id. at 934.

10. Id.
11.

Id. at 933-34.
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statutes. 12 In State v. Williams, 13 after the defendant hit the victim on her
temple with a firearm, the victim sustained a bleeding gash, fainted, and suffered from migraines and memory lOSS. 14 Over the State's objection, "the
trial court reduced the aggravated battery to simple battery and offered the
defendant a plea, which he accepted." 1 5 The basis for the court's action was
its finding that, on the facts of the case, "the firearm was not a deadly weapon as a matter of law" because it had not been "used or threatened to be
used in a manner likely to cause great bodily injury," nor had it been discharged or used to put the victim in fear.' 6 On appeal by the State, the Third
District Court of Appeal examined the aggravated battery statute,17 the definition of "deadly weapon" in the corresponding jury instruction, 18 and the
definition of "firearm" under section 790.001(6).' 9 The court concluded that
"[a] firearm is, by definition, a deadly weapon because it is designed to expel
a projectile by the action of an explosive which is likely to cause death or
great bodily injury. 2 ° If it is discharged or "used to put the victim in fear"
of an aggravated assault or a robbery, then "it is a deadly weapon as a matter
of law. . . regardless of whether the firearm is loaded or capable of being
fired.",2' The court ordered the trial court to allow Williams to withdraw his
guilty plea as to simple battery and to reinstate the aggravated battery
charge.22
The issue in Cambell v. State23 was whether Florida case law imposes
an additional element on the State in proving aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, 24 requiring the State to prove a defendant's intent "to do physical

12.

See Cambell v. State, 37 So. 3d 948, 950 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Wil-

liams, 10 So. 3d 1172, 1174 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

10 So. 3d 1172 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id. at 1173-74.
Id.at 1174; FLA. STAT. § 784.045(1)(a)(2) (2007).
Williams, 10 So. 3d at 1174; FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 8.4 (2009).

19.

Williams, 10 So. 3d at 1174; FLA. STAT. § 790.001(6) (2007).

20.

Williams, 10 So. 3d at 1174.

21. Id. In other cases, the Florida District Courts of Appeal found that bleach was a
deadly weapon within the meaning of the aggravated battery statute, when it was thrown into
the victim's face, Smith v. State, 969 So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007), and that a
bicycle thrown by a juvenile at his mother during an argument was not a deadly weapon under
the aggravated assault statute, D.B.B. v. State, 997 So. 2d 484, 485-86 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
22.

Williams, 10 So. 3d at 1175.

23.
24.

37 So. 3d 948 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
Id. at 949; FLA. STAT. § 784.021(1) (2008).
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harm to the victim. ' 25 Here, a police officer had testified he was afraid when
Mr. Cambell pointed a firearm at him in a threatening manner.26 In affirming
Cambell's conviction, the Fifth District Court of Appeal wrote to express its
opinion on "some confusion.., with respect to the elements of the crime of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. 2 7 The court examined dicta in
two recent appellate cases, 28 which suggested that the State is required to
prove the defendant's intent to harm the victim physically. 29 The court concluded, however, that "[tihe only intent inherent in the statutes is the intention to make a threat to do violence," and pointed out that courts generally
lack the authority to extend or modify the express elements of a statutory
30

crime.

I.
A.

HOMICIDE

Manslaughterby Act

During the survey period, the Florida courts struggled with the jury instruction for the offense of manslaughter by act under section 782.07(1) of
the FloridaStatutes. The jury instruction, which required the State to prove
that the defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim,3 was at odds
with the statutory definition of manslaughter, which required only an intent
to commit an act that was not justified or excusable. 32 In State v. Montgom34
ery,33 the Supreme Court of Florida endeavored to put the matter to rest.
In Montgomery's trial for first-degree murder, the trial court instructed
the jury on second-degree murder and manslaughter by act as lesser-included
offenses of the charged crime.35 The problematic instruction provided, in
relevant part, that the State was required to prove that the defendant "intentionally caused the death of the victim" but that it was "'not necessary for the36
State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated intent to cause death.'
25.
26.
27.
28.
Swift v.
29.
1199).
30.
31.

Cambell, 37 So. 3d at 949.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 950; see Denard v. State, 30 So. 3d 595, 596 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010);
State, 973 So. 2d 1196, 1199 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Cambell, 37 So. 3d 948, 950 (citing Denard, 30 So. 3d at 596; Swift, 973 So. 2d at
Id. at 950.
Id.; FLA. STD.

JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7
FLA. STAT. § 782.07(1) (2005).

32.

See

33.
34.
35.
36.

39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010).
See id. at 254.
Id.
Id. at 257 (quoting FLA. STD.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss1/4
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The jury found Montgomery guilty of second-degree murder, and he appealed.37 The First District Court of Appeal reversed his conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court fundamentally erred in
giving this jury instruction because "manslaughter by act does not require an
intent to kill. 38 The court certified conflict with the decision of the Fifth
District Court of Appeal in Barton v. State 39 and certified the following question of great public importance: "Is the State required to prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim in order to establish the crime of manslaughter by act?" 0
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed that the standard jury instruction
for manslaughter by act was fundamentally erroneous because it required the
State to prove that the defendant "intentionally caused the death of the vic4
tim," even though intent to kill was not an element of the offense. ' In other
words, this instruction "impose[d] a more stringent finding of intent upon
manslaughter than upon second-degree murder., 42 The Court further held
that the offense of manslaughter by act requires only "the intent to commit an
act that was not justified or excusable, which caused the death of the victim. ' 43 The Court answered the certified question in the negative and coninstruction concluded that the trial court's use of the standard manslaughter
trial. 44
new
a
necessitated
and
error
fundamental
stituted
Nevertheless, the Florida District Courts of Appeal wasted no time inv. State,45
terpreting Montgomery. First, the case was distinguished in Singh
where the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. 46 The standard
jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter required the
37. Id. at 254.
38. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d at 254.
39. 507 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam).
40. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d at 254. The Supreme Court of Florida did not reach the
certified conflict, given its resolution of the certified question. See id.
41. Id. at 257.
42. Id. at 256.
43. Id. at 260.
44. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d at 260. The manslaughter jury instruction has been amended
twice since the Montgomery trial. Williams v. State, 40 So. 3d 72, 74 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2010). "The [December] 2008 amendment added a clause... emphasizing [that] the intent
requirement [is] related to the commission of an act which caused death." Id.; see also In re
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2007-10, 997 So. 2d 403, 403
(2008) (per curiam). "The [April] 2010 amendment [authorized, on an interim basis,] delet[ion] [of] the word 'intentionally' before the phrase 'caused the death."' Williams, 40 So.
3d at 74; see In re Amendments to Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Instruction
7.7, 41 So. 3d 853, 854 (Apr. 8, 2010) (per curiam).
45. 36 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
46. Id. at 849.
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jury to find that the defendant caused the death either "intentionally" or by
"culpable negligence. 47 The defendant was convicted of second-degree
murder, which necessarily included a finding that he had not intended to kill
his victim. 48 The Fourth District Court of Appeal refused to find fundamental error, however, because the culpable negligence option allowed the jury
to return a manslaughter verdict without finding an intent to kill. 49 The instant case was therefore distinguishable from Montgomery, where the absence of an instruction on culpable negligence required a verdict of seconddegree murder upon finding an absence of intent to kill.5 °
Second, in Rushing v. State,5 1 the First District Court of Appeal applied
Montgomery to the standard jury instruction for attempted manslaughter by
act, holding that the instruction improperly includes an intent-to-kill element. 52 In this case, Rushing appealed his conviction for attempted seconddegree murder based on the trial court's use of the standard jury instruction
on the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. 5' The
appellate court held that the use of this jury instruction constituted fundamental error because it may have led the jury to believe Rushing could not be
convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter unless the jury first found the
element of intent to kill. 54 If so, then the jury would have felt compelled to
convict him of "attempted second-degree murder, which has no such element
of intent.",55 Thus, according to the court, the jury instruction for attempted
manslaughter by act "suffers from the very same infirmities as the instruction
in Montgomery."56 The First District reversed Rushing's conviction and remanded the case for new trial.57
This decision comported with the First District's earlier decision in
Lamb v. State.5 8 There, the court held that giving the standard jury instruction for attempted manslaughter by act constituted fundamental error because
that instruction improperly requires "that the defendant 'committed an act
47. Id. at 849-50.
48. See id. at 849.
49. Id.
50. Singh, 36 So. 3d at 851. The Third District Court of Appeal used the same reasoning
to affirm a defendant's conviction for second-degree murder based on similar jury instructions
in Cubelo v. State, 41 So. 3d 263, 267-68 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
51. 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1376 (1st Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2010).
52. Id. at D1377.
53. Id. at D1376.
54. Id. atD1377.

55. Id.
56.
57.
58.

Rushing, 35 Fla. L. Weekly at D1377.
Id.
18 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
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intended to cause tbe death' of the victim when attempted manslaughter by
act requires only an intentional unlawful act." 59
As a result of the First District's reasoning in Lamb, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal certified conflict in Williams v. State.6 ° In Williams, the
defendant appealed his conviction for attempted second-degree murder. 61
Williams argued that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Montgomery prohibited this instruction.62 The Fourth District disagreed and affirmed
his conviction on the ground that the instant case concerned an inchoate
crime not at issue in Montgomery.63 In other words, the error that occurred
in Montgomery, where the jury was instructed that "'an intent to kill' is an
element of manslaughter," does not exist when the jury is instructed that attempted voluntary manslaughter requires "an act which was intended to
cause the death of the victim." 64 Furthermore, the attempted second-degree
murder conviction meant that the jury necessarily found that he had intended
65
to commit an unlawful act that would have resulted in the victim's death.
Affirming the conviction, the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the First District Court of Appeal's contrary decision in Lamb and
certified two questions of great public importance: "(1) Does the standard
jury instruction on attempted manslaughter constitute fundamental error? (2)
Is attempted manslaughter a viable offense in light of State v. Montgomery?"

66

Felony Murder

B.

The state appellate courts have revisited Brooks v. State,67 in which the
Supreme Court of Florida found that the underlying felony of aggravated
child abuse could not serve as the predicate felony crime in a first-degree
felony murder charge if only a single act led to the child's death. 68 In that
situation, the Brooks court held, the felony would merge into the homicide. 69
In Lewis v. State,70 however, where the defendant was convicted of first59. Id. at 735.
60.
61.
62.
63.

40 So. 3d 72, 76 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
Id. at 73.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 74.

64. Id. at 75.
65. Williams, 40 So. 3d at 75 (citing FLA. STD.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

JURY INSTR. (CRIM.)

6.4 (2010)).

Id. at 75-76.
918 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam).
Id. at 198-99.
Id. at 199.
34 So. 3d 183 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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degree felony murder and the predicate felony of aggravated child abuse in
the drowning death of her seven-year-old daughter, the First District Court of
did not apply even if the death was
Appeal held that the merger doctrine
7
caused by a single act of abuse. '
The Lewis court articulated three reasons for this conclusion.72 First,
because the felony murder conviction was ultimately affirmed in Brooks, the
Supreme Court of Florida's statement about the merger doctrine was dictum. 73 Second, aggravated child abuse is expressly named in the felony
murder statute as a predicate offense for felony murder, demonstrating that
"the legislature intended that a defendant who kills a child during the perpetration of the crime of aggravated child abuse may be charged and convicted
of both aggravated child abuse and felony murder, regardless of the number
of acts of abuse which caused the child's death." 74 Finally, the defendant's
actions in holding her daughter under water "long enough to produce unconsciousness and then death, cannot be considered a single act [of
abuse].
Nevertheless, in affirming the defendant's felony murder conviction, the First District Court certified the following question as one of great
public importance: "Whether Brooks v. State holds that aggravated child
abuse cannot serve as the underlying felony in a felony murder charge if only
a single act of abuse led to the child's death. 7 6
Likewise, in Rosa v. State,77 the defendant relied on Brooks in his appeal of a conviction for first-degree felony murder of a thirteen-year-old
strangulation victim based on the predicate felony of aggravated child
abuse. 78 The Second District Court of Appeal refused to set aside his conviction, finding that the merger doctrine did not preclude using aggravated child
abuse as the underlying felony where the victim suffered multiple injuries in
addition to the strangulation that caused her death.79 Moreover, the court
was inclined not to view the strangulation as a single act of abuse. 80 Agreeing in part with the opinion in Lewis, the court observed that because the
language in Brooks does not refer to the felony murder statute and seems to
conflict with the plain language of section 782.04, it cannot be reconciled

71. Id. at 184.
72. See id. at 186-87.
73. Id. at 186.
74. Id. at 186-87.
75. Lewis, 34 So. 3d at 187.
76. Id. (citation omitted).
77. 35 Fla. L. Weekly D 1361 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 18, 2010).
78. Id. at D1361.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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with that statute. 8' The Rosa court also certified the issue as a question of
great public importance.8 2
C.

Second-Degree DepravedMind Murder

Under section 782.04(2), second-degree, depraved mind murder is
"[t]he unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any
particular individual. 8 3 To prove that an act is imminently dangerous and
demonstrates a depraved mind, one of the conditions that the State must
prove is that "a person of ordinary judgment would84know [it] is reasonably
certain to kill or do serious bodily injury to another.,
The issue that arose in Billie v. State85 was whether courts should use a
subjective or objective standard to assess this condition. 86 In this case, Kirk
Douglas Billie was convicted of second-degree murder after a jury found that
he had sunk his former girlfriend's truck into a canal, killing two of their
children. 87 On appeal, Billie argued that the trial court erred in refusing to
modify the standard jury instruction to include a subjective intent element.88
The added language would have instructed the jury that to prove the Billie
guilty of second-degree murder, the State was required to prove that he had
actual knowledge that his two children were asleep in the back of the truck
before he let it slip into the canal.89
The Third District Court of Appeal held, however, that the standard instruction adequately captured Billie's theory of defense. 90 First, by requiring
the defendant's act to be directed toward another person, the standard instruction included victims and therefore, by definition, included the question
of whether Billie knew his children were in the car. 91 Second, by requiring
the defendant's act to demonstrate "'a depraved mind without regard for human life,' the instruction permits the jury to consider the particular circums-

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Rosa, 35 Fla. L. Weekly at D1361.
FLA. STAT. § 782.04(2) (2010).
FLA. STD.JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.4 (2006).
963 So. 2d 837 (Fla.3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 841 & n.4.
Id. at 838-39.
Id. at 840.
Id.
Billie, 963 So. 2d at 841.
Id.
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tances and context of the defendant's charged conduct., 92 Finally, the court
rejected Billie's claim that a second-degree murder conviction requires the
jury to find that he performed the act "with the subjective knowledge of its
danger to another person." 93 Instead, the court stated that the jury instruction
sufficiently expresses the degree to which a defendant must know that his
actions are "'reasonably certain to kill... another.' 94 The court concluded
that "[b]ecause the standard jury instruction adequately conveys the law of
Florida and is neither confusing nor misleading, Billie [could not] 'overcome
the presumption of its correctness."95
D. Lesser Included Homicide Offense
96
a case of first impression, the Supreme
In Coicou v. State (Coicou I/),
Court of Florida addressed the lesser-included offense of attempted firstdegree felony murder.97 In this case, the defendant was convicted of attempted first-degree felony murder based on an attempted robbery with a
firearm, with the jury specifically finding that he had committed a robbery
and used a firearm.98 On appeal, Coicou argued, and the Third District Court
of Appeal agreed, that Florida law prohibits using the same act-the shooting of the victim-to prove both the attempted felony murder and the underlying felony offense. 99 Therefore, the State failed to prove the attempted
felony murder charge.' ° However, instead of reversing the conviction and
discharging the defendant, the appellate court remanded with instructions to
enter a verdict of attempted second-degree murder because the evidence contained in the record supported a conviction for that permissive lesserincluded offense."°1 The court certified the following question as one of
great public importance: "May an appellate court direct the entry of a con-

92. Id. (quoting FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.4 (2006)).
93. Id. at 841 n.4.
94. Id. at 841 (quoting FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.4)).
95. Billie, 963 So. 2d at 841 n.4 (quoting Sloss v. State, 925 So. 2d 419, 424 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
96. 39 So. 3d 237 (Fla.2010).
97. Id. at 239.
98. Id.
99. Coicou v. State (Coicou 1), 867 So. 2d 409, 411 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003), certifying question to 39 So. 3d 237 (Fla.2010).
100. Id. at 412 ("The use of force, the shooting, was itself an essential element of the
underlying robbery and was not an independent act as required by section 782.05 1(1).").
101. Id.
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viction for attempted second-degree murder where the jury's verdict
does not
1°2
reflect a finding that the defendant acted with a depraved mind?"
The certified question required the Supreme Court of Florida "to determine whether attempted second-degree murder is either a necessary or permissive lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree felony murder."' 3
The Court first concluded "that attempted second-degree murder is not a
necessarily lesser-included offense of attempted first-degree felony murder"
because the former "contains an element, a depraved mind, that is not an
element of the greater offense."'0" For the same reason, second-degree murder cannot be "a necessarily lesser-included offense of first-degree felony
murder."'0 5 Receding from Linehan v. State"° and Scurry v. State,'°7 the
Court directed the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases to consider revising the Florida Standard Jury Instructions." 8
The Court next addressed permissive lesser-included offenses, stating
that in order for attempted second-degree murder to be a permissive lesserincluded offense of attempted first-degree felony murder, the latter offense
must be charged in a manner demonstrating a depraved mind, "the required
mental element of attempted second-degree murder."'" Concluding that a
case-by-case determination is necessary when deciding this issue, the Supreme Court of Florida then reviewed the facts at hand in Coicou's case."0
Here, the charging document for attempted first-degree felony murder
alleged only that "Coicou had intentionally committed an act that could have
resulted, but did not result, in someone's death." However, it failed to allege
"an act that was 'imminently dangerous' or that 'demonstrated a depraved

102. Coicou II, 39 So. 3d at 238.
103. Id. at 242.
104. Id. at 243.
105. Id.
106. 476 So. 2d 1262, 1265 (Fla. 1985) (holding that "second-degree murder [is] a necessarily lesser included offense of first-degree felony-murder"), overruled in part by Coicou II,
39 So. 3d at 243.
107. 521 So. 2d 1077, 1078 (Fla. 1988) (holding "that second-degree murder is a necessarily lesser-included offense of first-degree felony murder"), overruled in part by Coicou II, 39
So. 3d at 243.
108. Coicou I, 39 So. 3d at 243.
109. Id. Attempted first-degree felony murder requires the act to be "committed during
the course of committing a felony," id. at 241, (citing FLA. STAT. § 782.051 (2001), while
attempted second-degree murder requires the act to be ."imminently dangerous to another and
evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life."' Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 782.04 (2001)
(amended 2002)).
110. Id.at241.
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' l
Because the allegations and the
mind without regard for human life.""'
evidence did not support a finding that Coicou acted with a depraved mind,
and the record did not indicate that the jury found the "depraved mind element," attempted second-degree murder was not a permissive lesser-included
offense of attempted first-degree felony murder." 2 Therefore, it was improper for the Third District Court of Appeal to direct entry of a conviction for
that crime. 113 The appropriate action would have been to "remand ... for
retrial on any lesser offenses contained in the charging instrument and instructed on at trial.""..4 Answering the certified question in the negative, the
Supreme Court of Florida quashed the Third District's decision, and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion. 15

IV. DEFENSES

A.

Florida's"Stand Your Ground" Law

Florida's "Stand Your Ground" Law," 6 which was signed into law on
April 26, 2005, permits the use of deadly or non-deadly force, "without fear
of prosecution or civil action,"'" 7 against an individual who unlawfully and
forcibly enters the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle of another person. 1I' The new statutory scheme eliminated the common law duty to retreat
before using deadly or non-deadly force in self-defense or defense of others,
so long as the person is being attacked in a place where he or she has a lawful right to be." 9 Despite the controversy surrounding this law, in the five
years since its enactment, there have been few appellate decisions interpreting its provisions.
The first issue that arose was whether the new law applied retroactively
to cases pending at the time of its effective date on October 1, 2005.120 The
111. Coicou II, 39 So. 3d at 243 (quoting State v. Florida, 894 So. 2d 941, 945-46 (Fla.
2005) (per curiam), overruledin part by Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1077 (Fla. 2009)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 244 (quoting State v. Wilson, 680 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 1996)).
115. Id. at244.
116. The term "Stand Your Ground Law" refers to sections 776.012-.013 and 776.031.032 of the FloridaStatutes collectively. Montanez v. State, 24 So. 3d 799, 801 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2010); see, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012-.013, .031-.032 (2010).
117. Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 5, 2005 Fla. Laws 199, 202 (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012-.013, .031-.032 (2010)). Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012,
.031 (2004), with FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012-.013, .031-.032 (2010).
118. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a)(2010).
119. Id. § 776.013(2)(a).
120. See ch. 2005-27, § 5, 2005 Fla. Laws at 202.
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Supreme Court of Florida, in Smiley v. State,'2 ' held that because Florida's
"Stand Your Ground" Law had effected a substantive change in the statutory
than a procedural change, it did not apply retroactively to pending
law, rather
2
cases. 1
The second issue involved jury instructions in the case of an unarmed
assailant.12 3 In McWhorter v. State,24 the defendant was convicted of battery
on his unarmed attacker.1 5 Although the jury instructions no longer expressly refer to a "duty to retreat," the trial judge included language stating that 26a
defendant should endeavor to avoid the danger before employing force.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal found that this language would cause
the jury to believe, mistakenly, that McWhorter could not use force in selfdefense unless he had first used "'every reasonable means within his power
to avoid the danger. '12' 7 However, as the court noted, section 776.013(3)
allows individuals who are attacked to stand their ground and meet force
with force, as long as they are neither involved in unlawful activity nor
present in a place where they did not have a right to be. 128 In other words,
they may use deadly force in this situation if they feel threatened with death
or great bodily harm, even if other means of self-protection are available,
and, in McWhorter's case, even if the attacker is unarmed.1 29 Because the
jury instructions misstated the law applicable to self-defense, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the defendant's battery conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. 3 °
The third issue under Florida's "Stand Your Ground" Law involved the
statutory immunity accorded to individuals who use force defending them-

121. 966 So. 2d 330 (Fla.2007).
122. Id. at 336-37; see also Williams v. State, 982 So. 2d 1190, 1193-94 (Fla.4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2008) (reversing a conviction for second-degree murder with a firearm on the ground
that the trial court had committed fundamental error in instructing the jury on the duty to
retreat, where the law had changed two days before the offense in question); Mitchell v. State,
965 So. 2d 246, 252 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming a first-degree murder conviction
on the ground that the new self-defense law did not apply to pending cases); Johnson v. State,
958 So. 2d 1152, 1152 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam) (affirming a conviction for
second-degree murder while armed with a firearm on the ground that the new self-defense law
did not apply to an offense committed in 2003).
123. McWhorter v. State, 971 So. 2d 154, 154 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
124. 971 So. 2d 154 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
125. Id. at 154-55.
126. Id. at 157.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2005)).
129. See McWhorter, 971 So. 2d at 157.
130. Id.
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Section 776.032 states that when a person is justified in
selves or others.'
using force under the statutory scheme, he or she "is immune from [both]
criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of such force. 132 The
preamble to the legislation declares that "it is proper for law-abiding people
to protect themselves, their families, and others from intruders and attackers
without fear of prosecution or civil action.' ' 133 Two appellate cases dealt
with the applicability of this immunity when the victim is in retreat.'34 In
Hair v. State, 135 the First District Court of Appeal held that the "Stand Your
Ground" Law makes no exception from immunity when the victim is in retreat at the time defensive force is used. 36 In State v. Heckman, 137 however,
the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that the statutory immunity
did not apply because the victim was retreating from Heckman's garage
when Heckman shot him. 3 8 The difference between the cases appears to be
that the victim in Hair "was still inside the vehicle when he was shot" and
had not completed his retreat, whereas the victim in139Heckman "had left the
[defendant's] garage and was retreating to his truck.'
The remaining decisions demonstrate conflict as to the correct procedure to be used in statutory immunity cases. The issue is whether factual
disputes should be resolved at a pretrial evidentiary hearing or at trial."4 In
Peterson v. State,14 1 the defendant sought a writ of prohibition to review the
denial of his motion to dismiss attempted first-degree murder charges.142 In
his motion, Peterson argued that he was entitled to statutory immunity for
justifiable use of force. 143 After a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied the motion on the ground "that immunity had not been established as
131. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1).
132. Id.
133. Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, 2005 Fla. Laws 199, 200 (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012-.013, .031-.032 (2010)).
134. See Hair v. State, 17 So. 3d 804, 806 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam); State
v. Heckman, 993 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
135. 17 So. 3d 804 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
136. Id. at 806. Because the trial court should have granted the motion to dismiss, the
appellate court issued a writ of prohibition. Id.
137. 993 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
138. Id. at 1006. The appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting defendant's
motion to dismiss the information that charged him with aggravated battery. Id.
139. Hair, 17 So. 3d at 806; Hecknan, 993 So. 2d at 1005.
140. See Peterson v. State, 983 So. 2d 27, 28 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008). This issue is
the central procedural issue facing the Florida courts and will be examined in case discussions
to follow. See id. at 29.
141. 983 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
142. Id. at 28.
143. Id.
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a matter of fact or law." 144 Finding that the trial court had applied the correct
standard, the First District Court of Appeal stated that the statute does not
establish an affirmative defense but rather a true immunity. 145 The immunity
claim should be resolved by the trial court after a pretrial evidentiary hearing
at which the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.' 46 In other words, the standard in Rule 3.190(c)(4) of the Florida
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides for a dismissal when "[t]here
are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a
prima facie case of guilt against the defendant," is inappropriate for a motion
or petition to determine immunity under section 776.032.147 According to
may not deny a motion to dismiss simply
the First District, the trial court
148
because factual disputes exist.
Although the Second, 149 Third 150 and Fifth District1 5' Courts of Appeal
have followed the Peterson decision, the Fourth District Court of Appeal has
disagreed and certified conflict in Velasquez v. State.1 52 In Velasquez, the
court ruled that the proper device for testing this statutory immunity is a
sworn motion to dismiss under Rule 3.190(c)(4) of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure and that whenever the State traverses and properly disputes the facts contained in the defense motion, the motion must be denied
and the issue determined at trial.1 53 More recently, in Wonder v. State,"M the
Fourth District certified conflict again and certified the following question as
one of great public importance:

Id.
145. Id. at 29.
146. Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29.
144.

FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(c)(4); see FLA. STAT. § 776.032 (2010).
148. Peterson, 983 So. 2d at 29.
149. McDaniel v. State, 24 So. 3d 654, 656-57 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Horn v.
State, 17 So. 3d 836, 839 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also Montanez v. State, 24 So. 3d
799, 801 n.2 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App 2010) (noting that a homicide defendant whose motion for
immunity was denied could still "present self-defense as an affirmative defense at trial").
150. State v. Yaqubie, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1342, D1342 (3d Dist. Ct. App. June 16, 2010).
The Yaqubie court certified conflict with Velasquez v. State, 9 So. 3d 22 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2009). Yaqubie, 35 Fla. L. Weekly at D1344.
151. Gray v. State, 13 So. 3d 114, 115 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
152. 9 So. 3d 22, 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Conflict was also certified in Govoni
v. State, 17 So. 3d 809, 810 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam), reh'g granted, 2009
Fla. App. LEXIS 15644 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2009) and in McTigue v. State, 24 So. 3d
584, 584 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
153. See Velasquez, 9 So. 3d at 24; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(c)(4).
154. 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1829 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2010) (per curium).

147.
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Whether section 776.032, Florida Statutes, (2009) (the "Stand
Your Ground" Law), requires a trial court, upon motion to dismiss,
to hold an evidentiary hearing prior to trial and resolve disputed
factual issues to determine whether a defendant has established by
a preponderance of the evidence his/her entitlement to statutory
immunity from prosecution.155
B.

The ForcibleFelony Exception to a Claim of Self-Defense

The defense of justified use of force in self-defense "is not available to
a person who: (1) Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the
commission of, a forcible felony; or (2) Initially provokes the use of
force."' 56 While this defense seems simple enough in concept, Florida's
courts have struggled with the accompanying jury instruction. 157 The confusion centers on whether a trial court commits a fundamental error by erroneously reading the forcible felony instruction when a defendant has not
committed an independent forcible felony. 5 8 The Supreme Court of Florida
addressed this issue in Martinez v. State.'59 In that case, after stabbing his
girlfriend multiple times, Martinez was charged with attempted premeditated
murder and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon.16° He claimed selfdefense. 6 ' The trial court instructed the jury, without objection, that they
could not find that Martinez acted in self-defense if he "was attempting to
commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of an Attempted
Murder and/or Aggravated Battery.' 62 The court also instructed the jury on
the initial aggressor exception to self-defense in section 776.041(2) of the
FloridaStatutes. 163 Martinez was convicted, and he appealed. 164 The Third
District Court of Appeal affirmed on the ground that, although the instruction
forciwas erroneous because Martinez was not charged with an independent
65
ble felony, the error did not rise to the level of fundamental error.
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted review based upon express and
direct conflict with several cases in which district courts have held that a trial
155. Id. (citations and emphasis omitted).
156. FLA. STAT. § 776.041 (2010).
157.

See FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRim) 3.6(f), (g) (2010).

158. Martinez v. State (Martinez I1), 981 So. 2d 449, 450-51 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam).
159. 981 So. 2d 449, 450-51 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam).
160. Id. at 450.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 450 (quoting Martinez v. State (Martinez 1)), 933 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2006), af3fd on other grounds, 981 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2008).
163. Id. at 453.
164. Martinez II, 981 So. 2d at 450.
165. Martinez 1, 933 So. 2d at 1158.
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court commits fundamental error by "giv[ing] the forcible-felony instruction
when the defendant has committed only one forcible act. ' 166 The Court
agreed that the instruction was erroneous because the defendant's selfdefense claim rested upon the same act that formed the basis of the charges
against him. 167 In other words, the forcible-felony instruction is appropriate
only when the defendant is charged with a forcible felony separate and apart
from the act for which he or she claims self-defense. 168 Any other result, the
Court reasoned, would render the initial aggressor exception in section
776.041(2) of the Florida Statutes superfluous and negate a claim of justifiable use of deadly force. 16 9 The effect in this case was that, even if the jury
had concluded that Martinez acted in self-defense when he committed aggravated battery or attempted murder, a finding of self-defense was precluded 70if
the jury found that he committed attempted murder or aggravated battery.1
This "circular logic" would be equivalent to directing a verdict on the affirmative defense. 71 Thus, the Court agreed with Martinez that the trial court
felony instruction to the jury. 172 The analysis did
erred in giving the forcible
173
not end there, however.
The Court then pointed out that, in the absence of an objection at trial,
this instructional error could not be raised on appeal unless fundamental error
occurred. 174 When, as here, an affirmative defense is involved, fundamental
error does not occur unless the instruction is so deficient that it deprives the
defendant of a fair trial. 17 5 In the instant case, however, the Court found no
fundamental error and identified two reasons for this conclusion. 176 First,
because the defendant had pursued other strategies besides self-defense, the
error "did not deprive Martinez of his sole, or even his primary, defense
strategy."177 Second, his "claim of self-defense was extremely weak. 17 8
The Court disapproved of those district court decisions holding that "an erroneous reading of the forcible-felony instruction always constitutes funda-

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Martinez II, 981 So. 2d at 451.
Id. at 453.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Martinez II, 981 So. 2d at 453.
Id. at 454.
See id.
Id. at 455 (citing State v. Delva, 575 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam)).
Id. (citing Smith v. State, 521 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1988)).
Martinez I, 981 So. 2d at 456.
Id.
Id.
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mental error" and expressly deferred rendering a decision as to whether the
error "could constitute fundamental error in some circumstances.' 7 9
C.

Imperfect Self-Defense

In Hill v. State, 8 ° the Third District Court of Appeal held that Florida
does not recognize imperfect self-defense.' 8' The appellate court concluded
that the requested jury instruction, defining imperfect self-defense as "[a]n
honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend oneself against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury,"'' 82 is contrary to the self-defense
statute, 183"which requires a reasonable belief in the necessity to use deadly
force.'

D.

Statute of Limitations

In State v. Suarez,184 a case of first impression, the Third District Court
of Appeal held that the statute of limitations on charges for third-degree
grand theft and burglary of an unoccupied dwelling was not tolled while the
85
defendant was incarcerated in federal prison within the State of Florida.
Because the statute of limitations refers to geographic location, not the
state's jurisdiction over the defendant, the court found that the defendant had
satisfied the requirement that he be physically located within the state. 186
was served, and
The limitations period had expired before the arrest warrant
87
so the trial court had properly dismissed the charges.
V.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

In Graham v. Florida,188 the Supreme Court of the United States held,
in a five-to-four decision, that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause prohibits the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 457.
979 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1135 n.2.
Id. at 1135 (citing FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2000)).
13 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at73.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT §§ 775.15(5), 812.035(10) (2001)).
Id. at 74.
130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010).
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on a juvenile offender for a non-homicide offense. 89 Graham committed
armed burglary when he was sixteen.190 Under a plea agreement, the Florida
trial court sentenced him to probation, with the first year to be served in jail,
and withheld adjudication of guilt.1 91 Following his release from jail, Graham committed additional crimes, which the trial court found to have violated the terms of his probation.' 92 Consequently, Graham was found guilty
of the original charges and sentenced to life imprisonment for the armed burglary. 193 Because parole has been abolished in Florida, Graham's life sentence meant that he would never be eligible for release without executive
clemency. 94 After Graham's Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence
was rejected by the trial court and the First District Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida denied
review. 195 The Supreme Court of the United
196
States granted certiorari.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy noted that Eighth Amendment
challenges "addressing the proportionality of sentences fall within two general classifications. The first [concerns] challenges to the length of term-ofyears sentences .... ,197 In these cases, the Court employs a case-specific
analysis. 98 The second "use[s] categorical rules to define Eighth Amendment standards," generally in capital cases. 199 Graham, however, presented a
novel issue in that it entailed "a categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence., 200 Because the case involved "a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed a range of crimes,"
Justice Kennedy concluded that it should be analyzed as a categorical challenge under the second category, borrowing from the Court's approach in
capital cases.20 '
Applying this categorical analysis, Justice Kennedy first determined
that both a national and global consensus existed against imposing life-

189. Id. at 2030.
190. Id. at 2018.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 2019.
193. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020.
194. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003) (amended 2010)). Florida got rid of the
parole system as found in the language of section 921.002(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes. See
FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2010).

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020.
Id.
Id. at 2021.
See id.
Id. at 2022.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
Id. at 2022-23.
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without-parole sentences for juvenile non-homicide offenders.2 °2 Second, he
concluded penological theory is inadequate to justify this type of sentence for
this type of offender. °3 Because of their "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," juvenile offenders are less culpable and less
deserving of the most severe punishments than an adult offender. 20 4 In light
of these developmental factors and the severity of the sentence, the Court
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from making the judgment
that a juvenile offender is irredeemably depraved and from depriving that
offender "of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and selfrecognition of human worth and potential., 20 5 While the "'[s]tate is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a
nonhomicide crime,' [it] must provide... 'some meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.,,26
Justice Stevens filed a brief concurring opinion in which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined.20 7 Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment and filed an opinion asserting that, while he agreed the sentence in the
present case violated the Eighth Amendment, he saw "no need to invent a
new constitutional rule of dubious provenance in reaching that conclusion. 208
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Scalia joined
209
Justice Thomas wrote that the ultimate
and Justice Alito joined in part.
question was not whether the punishment fits the offense or the offender "but
to whom the Constitution assigns that decision., 210 In his view, that the majority had rejected the judgments of legislatures, judges, and juries regarding
the appropriateness of the sentence under consideration "simply illustrates
how far beyond any cognizable constitutional principle the Court has reached
to ensure that its own sense of morality and retributive justice pre-empts that
,,211
of the people and their representatives.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Alito pointed out that the
of a sentence to a term of
Court's opinion does not affect "the imposition
21 2
parole.,
of
possibility
the
years without
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 2023.
Id. at 2030.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2038 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 2030-32.
Id. at 2057 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2058 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Double Jeopardy

Although the rule of double jeopardy "prohibits subjecting a person to
multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal
offense . . . no constitutional prohibition [exists] against multiple punishments for [separate] offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction,
[provided] the Legislature intends to authorize separate punishments." ' 3
Absent clear legislative intent, however, courts utilize section 775.021(4)(b)
of the FloridaStatutes to determine whether separate offenses exist.214 Section 775.021(4)(b) sets out three exceptions to the general rule that the Legislature intends "to convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed
in the course of one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the prin21 5
ciple of lenity as set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent.,
The second exception precludes multiple convictions for offenses that are
"degrees of the same offense as provided by statute. 2 1 6 In the past, the Supreme Court of Florida has required a two-step inquiry to construe this provision. l7 The first step was to determine "whether the crimes constitute separate offenses under Blockburger v. United States,2 18 as codified in section
775.021(4)(a). 2 9 The second step was to determine "whether the crimes are
'degree variants' or aggravated forms of the same core offense." 22 This
second step involved the "primary evil" test, which focused on whether the
offenses are designed to combat the same evil.

2l

More recently, however, in Valdes v. State,222 the Supreme Court of
Florida acknowledged that the district courts have struggled to apply the
primary evil test and that the Court itself has strained "to craft a consistent

213. Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 2009).
214. Hayes v. State 803 So. 2d 695, 700 (Fla. 2001). Section 775.021(4)(b) prohibits
multiple convictions and punishments for "(1) Offenses which require identical elements of
proof, (2) Offenses which are degrees of the same offense as provided by statute, [and] (3)
[o]ffenses which are lesser offenses the statutory elements of which are subsumed by the
greater offense." FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)(1)-(3) (2010).
215. Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1072; FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b).
216. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)(2).
217. Gordon v. State, 780 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam), overruled in part by
Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1077 (Fla. 2009).
218. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
219. Gordon, 780 So. 2d at 21.

220. Id.
221. Id.at 23 (citing Carawan v. State, 515 So. 2d 161, 173 (Fla. 1987) (Shaw, J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Act effective July 1, 1988, ch. 88-131, § 7, 1988 Fla. Laws 709,
as recognized in Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1072 (Fla. 2009)).
222. 3 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 2009).
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interpretation that would provide guidance to trial and district courts. 2 23 The
Court, therefore, abandoned the test in favor of a simpler approach.224 According to the new test, section 775.021(4)(b) includes only those offenses
that are included in the same charging statute and are explicitly provided by
that statute to be degrees of the same offense.225 In other words, separate
punishments for crimes arising from the same criminal transaction are prohibited only when the statute itself provides for multiple degrees of the same
offense. 226 Applying this test, the Court held that the rule against double
jeopardy was not violated by the defendant's dual convictions for discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of another person and shooting
into an occupied vehicle because "the two offenses are found in separate
statutory provisions; neither offense is an aggravated form of the other; and
they are clearly not degree variants of the same offense." 227
Shortly after Valdes was decided, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
issued a two sentence opinion in Shazer v. State,228 holding that "dual convictions for robbery with a deadly weapon and grand theft violate double jeopardy rights because the same property formed the basis for both convic'
tions."229
Shazer's conviction for grand theft was reversed and the case was
remanded with directions to the trial court to vacate his conviction and sentence. 230 However, in McKinney v. State,23' the Fifth District Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that section 775.021(4)(b)(2) did not bar dual convictions for "grand theft and robbery with a firearm [arising out of] a single
taking of cash and a cell phone at gunpoint. '23 2 Reasoning that "robbery is
not a degree of theft nor is theft a degree of robbery," the court upheld
convictions and certified express and direct conflict with Shazer
McKinney's
3
23

v. State.

Two Florida District Courts of Appeal found that Valdes, which addressed degrees of the same offense, did not apply to dual convictions for
resisting an officer with and without violence.234 In both cases, the appellate
223. Id. at 1075.
224. See id. at 1077.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1075-76.
227. Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1077.
228. 3 So. 3d 453 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
229. Id. at 454.
230. Id.
231. 24 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
232. Id. at 683.
233. Id. at 684; see Shazer, 3 So. 3d at 454.
234. See Brown v. State, 36 So. 3d 826, 828 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Ruiz-Alegria
v. State, 14 So. 3d 1276, 1277 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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courts found that the convictions violated double jeopardy.2 3 In Brown v.
State,236 the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that Valdes does not apply to
"lesser offenses," such as resisting without violence, "that are subsumed by a
greater offense," such as resisting with violence. 237 In Ruiz-Alegria v.
State,2 38 the Second District Court of Appeal found that Valdes does not apply to the situation that occurs when conduct begins as resisting without violence and then evolves into resisting with violence, provided that the conduct occurs in a single criminal episode.239
When a defendant commits two or more distinct criminal acts, however, multiple convictions and punishments are not proscribed by the rule
against double jeopardy, 24 ° Florida's sexual battery laws are especially susceptible to the distinct acts exception because the statutes may be violated in
42 the defendant was conmyriad ways. 24' In State v. Meshell (Meshell II),
victed of two counts of lewd and lascivious battery pursuant to section
800.04(4), one count by vaginal penetration, and one count by oral penetration." The Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded that the dual convictions violated double jeopardy because the record did not demonstrate a
"temporal break" sufficient for the defendant to have formed a new criminal
intent.244 Because there was a split among the Florida appellate courts, however, the court certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of great public importance: "Are the sex acts proscribed by sections 794.011 and 800.04(4), Florida Statutes, properly viewed as 'distinct
criminal acts' for double jeopardy purposes, so that a defendant can be sepafor each distinct act committed during a single criminal epirately convicted
, ,245
sode?
The Supreme Court of Florida limited review of this certified question
to section 800.04(4), which was the only section at issue before the appellate
235. Id.
236. 36 So. 3d 826 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
237. Id. at 832.
238. 14 So. 3d 1276 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
239. See id. at 1277.
240. Hayes v. State, 803 So. 2d 695, 700 (Fla. 2001) (citing Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299, 302-04 (1932)).
241. See Saavedra v. State, 576 So. 2d 953, 956-57 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991), approved by 622 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1993).
242. 2 So. 3d 132 (Fla.2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 110 (2009).
243. Id. at 133; see FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4) (2006) (amended 2008).
244. Meshell v. State (Meshell 1), 980 So. 2d 1169, 1171 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008),
certifying question to 2 So. 3d 132 (Fla.2009).
245. Id. at 1175 (citations omitted); see FLA. STAT. §§ 794.011, 800.04(4) (2006)
(amended 2008).
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court, and answered the certified question affirmatively. 2" Finding that vaginal and oral penetration were two distinct acts "of a separate character and
type requiring different elements of proof," the Court concluded that the
Florida Legislature intended multiple punishments. 247 To arrive at this conclusion, the Court first compared the lewd and lascivious battery statute, under which Meshell was charged, to the sexual battery statute, noting that the
same sexual acts were proscribed under both statutes.24 8 Accordingly, the
Court determined that the double jeopardy analysis applicable to the sexual
249
battery statute should apply to the lewd and lascivious battery statute.
Under the sexual battery analysis, no temporal break is required, and double
jeopardy considerations do not prohibit separate convictions for distinct acts
of sexual battery that are committed in the course of a single episode.2 5 ° Applying this analysis to the case at hand, the Court held that the oral and vaginal acts of penetration with which Meshell was charged under section
800.04(4) were distinct criminal acts "of a separate character and type requiring different elements of proof., 251 Therefore, the rule against double jeo252
Quashing
pardy was not violated by punishments for these distinct acts.
the Fifth District's decision in Meshell I, the Court remanded the case with
directions to reinstate the original convictions and sentences.253
In Meshell H, the Supreme Court of Florida expressly limited its review
of the double jeopardy issue to the lewd and lascivious battery statute, section

8 00 .0 4 ( 4 ).2

4

For this reason, in Brown v. State,255 the Second District

Court of Appeal declined to apply the reasoning of Meshell H to a defendant's conviction of two counts of lewd and lascivious molestation pursuant
to section 800.04(5)(a).256 After Brown's convictions were affirmed on appeal, he filed a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
for failure to raise the double jeopardy issue. 257 The Second District distinguished Meshell II on the ground that the acts of lewd and lascivious touching proscribed by section 800.04(5)(a) differ from those acts proscribed by
246.
247.
248.
249.

Meshell 11, 2 So. 3d at 134; see FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4).
Meshell 11, 2 So. 3d at 135-36.
Id. at 136 (comparing FLA.STAT. § 800.04(4) with FLA.
Id.

STAT.

§ 794.011 (2006)).

250. Id. at 135-36.
251. Id. at 136; see FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4) (2006) (amended 2008).
252. Meshell 11, 2 So. 3d at 136.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 134.
255. 25 So. 3d 78 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
256. Id. at 80; see also FLA. STAT. § 800.04(5)(a) (defining "[Ilewd or [1]ascivious
[m]olestation").
257. Brown, 25 So. 3d at 78.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss1/4

24

Goldman: Criminal Law: 2007-2010 Survey of Florida Law

2010]

CRIMINAL LAW: 2007-2010 SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW

119

the sexual battery statute. 258 "Because the supreme court has not addressed
the court
the double jeopardy issue in the context of section 800.04(5)(a),"
259
ordered a new appeal on Brown's double jeopardy claim.
Meshell II was also distinguished in J.M. v. State,2 ° where the Fifth
District Court of Appeal found that the lewd or lascivious touching by the
defendant did not involve "sexual activity., 261 In fact, the court observed
that "[w]ith only one exception, not relevant to this appeal, lewd or lascivious conduct only requires the intentional touching of someone under age
16 in a lewd and lascivious manner without regard to where the victim is
touched.,262 Both touching incidents in this case involved the same victim
and occurred sequentially on the school bus with "no meaningful spatial or
temporal break during which J.M. could pause, reflect and form a new criminal intent., 263 Therefore, the Fifth District held that J.M.'s convictions for
two counts of lewd or lascivious conduct under section 800.04(6)(c) violated
double jeopardy. 264

In Partch v. State,265 the First District Court of Appeal held that defendant's dual convictions under sections 794.011(4) and 794.011(5) of the
Florida Statutes, for sexual battery by vaginal penetration and attempted
sexual battery on a person helpless to resist, violated principles of double
jeopardy.26 6 The court declined to follow Meshell II because ambiguities in
the charging document and the jury verdict made it impossible to determine
whether Partch had been convicted for two distinct acts of sexual battery or
one act. 267 Instead, the court's decision was based on a statutory trigger in
section 794.011(6) that "would render the two offenses degrees of one
another" under Valdes.268 The court reversed the conviction for attempted

sexual battery on a person helpless to resist and remanded for resentencing
on the sexual battery charge.269

258. Id. at 80. Compare FLA. STAT. § 800.04(5)(a), with FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4).

259. Brown, 25 So. 3d at 80.
260. 4 So. 3d 703 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
261. Id. at 704 n.1.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 704.
264. Id. However, the Fifth District Court of Appeal followed Meshell II in State v. Gonzalez, 24 So. 3d 595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam), in holding that the defendant's dual convictions for lewd and lascivious battery did not violate double jeopardy. Gonzalez, 24 So. 3d at 595.
265. 43 So. 3d 758 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
266. Id. at 759; see FLA. STAT. § 794.011(4)-(5) (2008).
267. Partch,43 So. 3d at 762.
268. Id. at 764.
269. Id.
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The issue facing the First District Court of Appeal in Roberts v. State27 °
was whether double jeopardy principles were violated by the defendant's
convictions for two counts of sexual battery of a person less than twelve
years of age and two counts of lewd or lascivious molestation of a victim less
than twelve years of age. 27' The victim's testimony established that Roberts
had committed lewd or lascivious molestation twice during the sexual battery
episode: once by vaginal penetration and once by oral penetration.272 Applying Meshell II, the court held that the defendant's dual convictions for sexual
battery and lewd or lascivious molestation did not violate principles of
double jeopardy because they were based on discrete criminal acts committed during a single criminal episode.273
The meaning of criminal punishment in the context of Florida's chemical castration statute was considered by the Fourth District Court of Appeal
in Tran v. State.274 At the defendant's sentencing hearing for a second sexual

battery conviction, the trial court ordered administration of medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) injections but reserved ruling on the duration of
treatment pending determination by a psychiatrist as to whether the defendant was an appropriate candidate for chemical castration.275 Four months
after Tran began serving his prison sentence, the trial court ordered that he
receive MPA treatment for a period of five years after his release from prison. 276 Because section 794.0235(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes requires that
the court's sentencing order specify the duration of treatment, the appellate
court found that this delayed order "amounted to a more onerous punishment., 277 As such, it violated double jeopardy principles and was not a valid
portion of the defendant's original sentence. 278 Rejecting the State's contention that the MPA statute is intended for remedial treatment purposes, the
appellate court noted that the statute is located within Florida's criminal code

270.

39 So. 3d. 372 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
Id. at 373. Compare FLA. STAT. § 794.011(2)(a) (2008) with FLA. STAT. §
800.04(5)(b) (2006) (amended 2008).
272. Roberts, 39 So. 3d at 373.
273. Id. at 374. The court's opinion appears to refer to Justice Canady's concurring opinion in Meshell II, where he noted that the decision did not deny that "separate instances of
the same type of criminal sex act in a single episode may be punishable as separate offenses."
See Meshell II, 2 So. 3d 132, 137 (Fla.2009) (Canady, J., concurring), cert. denied, 130 S.Ct.
110 (2009).
274. 965 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007); see FLA. STAT. § 794.0235
271.

(2006).
275. Tran, 965 So. 2d at 228.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 229.

278.

Id. at 230.
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and not within its public health code.279 Moreover, "[tihe language of the
entire statute speaks of MPA in terms of a sentence and a penalty" and "the
administration of MPA is imposed as part of a criminal sentence. ,280 Thus,
the Fourth District held that a sentence to administration of MPA injections
constitutes criminal punishment for purposes of double jeopardy.281
The Florida District Courts of Appeal also considered double jeopardy
claims when charges were based on a single item of property or on its component parts. 282 In Dyson v. State,283 where the defendant stole a motorcycle,
the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that double jeopardy was violated by
284
defendant's convictions for both robbery and carjacking of the same item.
Because carjacking is a subset of robbery, and the convictions were based on
"identical elements of proof," the appellate court ordered the robbery conviction to be vacated.285
In other decisions, the courts considered whether double jeopardy was
violated when multiple charges were based on the component parts of a single item of property.286 In Boyd v. State,287 for example, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal held that double jeopardy was violated by dual convictions
for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, even though the firearm was not loaded with the
ammunition.288 The decision turned on the wording in section 790.23, which
provides, in relevant part, that it is unlawful for a convicted felon "to own or
to have in his or her care, custody, possession, or control any firearm, ammunition, or electric weapon or device., 289 The court found "that because
the word 'any' precedes the list of' contraband items, double jeopardy precludes multiple convictions where, during a single episode, the defendant possessed more than one item in that list.290 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
followed Boyd in Francis v. State,29 1 which also involved dual convictions

279. Id. at 229.
280. Tran, 965 So. 2d at 229.
281. Id. at 228.
282. Dyson v. State, 10 So. 3d 650, 651 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
283. 10 So. 3d 650 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
284. Id. at 651.
285. Id.
286. See e.g., Francis v. State, 41 So. 3d 975, 976 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Hanfield v.
State, 40 So. 3d 905, 906 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Boyd v. State, 17 So. 3d 812, 815 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
287. 17 So. 3d 812 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
288. Id. at 818.
289. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 790.23(1) (1995) (amended 1998) (emphasis added).
290. Boyd, 17 So. 3d at 818.
291. 41 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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for possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon.292 In
Francis,however, the ammunition was fully encased within the firearm.29 3
Similarly, in Hanfield v. State,294 the defendant was convicted of armed robbery of the keys to the car for which she was also convicted of carjacking.29 5
Holding that the taking of the car keys cannot be considered as a separate
property item to warrant conviction for armed robbery, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal directed the trial court to vacate that conviction. 296
C.

Due Process
1.

Entrapment

The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that an objective entrapment test
should have been used to determine whether the defendant's due process
rights had been violated by government misconduct in Hernandez v. State.2 97
Hernandez, a cocaine addict, testified that he had only agreed to locate a seller for a cocaine purchase because the confidential informant who approached him "promised him a portion of the product." 298 He also testified
that the informant knew of his addiction and had sold him cocaine in the
past. 299 The seller and Hernandez were arrested when they met to complete
the sale, and Hernandez was charged with trafficking in cocaine. 300 In a motion to dismiss, defense counsel argued that, under the objective entrapment
test, Hernandez's due process rights had been violated by the informant's
improper conduct in enticing Hernandez, a known addict, by the promise of
payment in drugs.301 Applying what appeared to be a subjective test, the trial
court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that no entrapment had occurred
because "the testimony suggest[ed] a propensity to commit a sale and delivery of cocaine. ,302

On appeal of the denial of his motion to dismiss, the Third District
Court of Appeal noted that, although the trial court may have properly decided that the defendant was not entitled to relief under section 777.201,
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 976.
Id. at 976-77.
40 So. 3d 905 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).

295. Id. at 906.
296. Id. at 907-08.
297.

17 So. 3d 748, 751 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).

298.
299.
300.
301.

Id. at 749.
Id.
Id. at 749-50.
Id. at 750.

302. Hernandez, 17 So. 3d at 750.
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Florida's entrapment statute, Hernandez had not sought relief under that statute.3 °3 The trial court had therefore failed to address the issue raised by the
defendant's motion to dismiss. 3° 4 Although it is not "a per se due process
violation for a government informant to offer illegal drugs to a known drug
addict as an inducement to enter into an illegal activity," the appellate court
stated that the trial court must nevertheless "evaluate all relevant circumstances and then determine whether the government conduct 'so offends decency or a sense of justice that judicial power may not be exercised to obtain
a conviction.' 30 5 Therefore, on remand, the trial court was directed to apply
an objective entrapment test to determine whether the alleged governmental
misconduct violated the defendant's due process rights. 3°
The Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed a similar claim in Bist v.
State.307 In this case, a police department enlisted the help of an independent
nonprofit organization, Perverted Justice, which provided decoys for a pedophile sting operation to be filmed for a network television program, To Catch
3 °8 Here, Bist initiated an online conversation
a Predator.
with "Jenna," a
Perverted Justice decoy, believing her to be a thirteen-year-old girl. 309 After
engaging in graphic sexual conversations online, he traveled to meet Jennah
for a tryst.310 Once at the designated location, however, he found himself
being filmed.31 When he tried to leave, he was arrested and charged with
attempted lewd and lascivious battery, computer pornography, and child exploitation.312 In his motion to dismiss, Bist argued that law enforcement's
conduct was so egregious that it amounted to objective entrapment in violation of his due process rights.3 13 After his motion was denied, Bist pled no
contest, reserving his right to appeal the trial court's ruling. 314
The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that law enforcement's methods
were not "so outrageous that due process considerations would bar prosecution. 315 In support of this conclusion, the court noted first that Bist had not
303. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 777.201 (2007).
304. Hernandez, 17 So. 3d at 750.
305. Id. at 751 (quoting State v. Blanco, 896 So. 2d 900, 901 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(en banc) (citing Campbell v. State, 935 So. 2d 614, 619 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
306. Id.
307. 35 So. 3d 936, 938 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.at 939.
311. Id.
312. Bist, 35 So. 3d at 939.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at941.
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been "solicited, induced, or otherwise lured into seeking a sexual liaison with
a Perverted Justice decoy. 316 To the contrary, he had contacted the decoy on
his own initiative.3 17 Additionally, the electronic recording and storage of all
communications between the defendant and the decoy allayed any concern
that Perverted Justice had a financial "incentive to manufacture crime or
commit pejury. 3 18 It also insured the integrity of a process that, in spite of
being unsupervised and unmonitored, did not result in unscrupulous conduct.3 19 For these reasons, the appellate court rejected Bist's objective entrapment defense and held that due process considerations did not bar prosecution. 320
2.

Vagueness

The statute prohibiting racing on highways 321 was subject to constitutional challenge in two cases. 32212In the first case, State v. Wells,323 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague,
both on its face and as applied to the defendant.324 In this case, after Wells
was charged with racing on the highway, he filed a motion to dismiss challenging the constitutionality of the statute.325 The trial court granted the motion on the ground that section 316.191 was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, and the State appealed.3 26
The language in question involved the statutory definition of racing,
which includes "the use of one or more motor vehicles in an attempt to outgain or outdistance another motor vehicle., 327 Because this part of the definition does not include an element of competition, the appellate court in
Wells noted that it "could encompass passing, accelerating from a stop," and
316. Id. at 940.
317. Bist, 35 So. 3d at 940.
318. Id.
319. Id.at941.
320. Id. The court also held that Bist's entrance into what he thought was a thirteen-yearold girl's home, in possession of "flowers, chocolate, lubricant and condoms," constituted an
overt act "sufficient to prove a prima facie case of attempted lewd and lascivious battery." Id.
at 942.
321. FLA. STAT.§ 316.191 (2010).
322. See Reaves v. State, 979 So. 2d 1066, 1068 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam); State v. Wells, 965 So. 2d 834, 836 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
323. 965 So. 2d 834 (Fla.4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
324. Id. at 837.
325. Id. at 836.
326. Id.
327. FLA.STAT. § 316.191(1)(c) (2005), invalidated by Wells, 965 So. 2d at 834 (amended
2009).
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myriad otherwise legal and even illegal maneuvers that drivers routinely
employ.3 28 Furthermore, the statute was vague as applied because it did not
clearly prohibit the defendant's alleged conduct and it was unclear whether
Wells was trying to "outgain or outdistance" the other driver or merely exceeding the speed limit. 329 The statute was not unconstitutional for overbreadth, however, because it did not affect a fundamental right. 330 The
Fourth District concluded that the trial court properly found section 316.191
to be unconstitutionally vague both facially and as applied. 331 The court reversed the conviction and "remanded in33part
for the trial court to strike the
2
overbreadth findings.., from its order.,
In the second case, Reaves v. State,333 the First District Court of Appeal
disagreed with the Fourth District's conclusion that the statute was vague
because the definition of "racing" lacked an element of competition. 334 Instead, the court reasoned that the definition should be read together with related statutory provisions, which in turn provide the element of competition.335 For example, section 316.191(2)(a)(1) expressly prohibits the conduct of engaging in "'any race, speed competition or contest, drag race or
acceleration contest"' on a public road against another vehicle.33 6 Section
316.191(1)(b) in turn defines "drag race" as the operation of two vehicles
engaged "'in a competitive attempt to outdistance each other.' ' 337 The court
concluded that, when these provisions are read together as a coherent whole,
the statute could be applied only when vehicles are competing with each
other.3 38 Thus, the First District found section 316.191 facially constitutional
and affirmed the defendant's conviction for racing on a highway.339

328. Wells, 965 So. 2d at 839.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. 979 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
334. Id. at 1072.
335. Id.
336. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 316.191(2)(a)(1) (2005), invalidatedby Wells, 965 So. 2d at
834 (amended 2009)).
337. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 316.191(1)(b) (2005), invalidated by Wells, 965 So. 2d at
834 (amended 2009)).
338. Reaves, 979 So. 2d at 1072.
339. Id. Reaves also sought to withdraw his plea of guilty to vehicular homicide, arguing
that the other racer, Street, was the sole proximate cause of the victim's death. Id. at 1069.
The trial court denied the motion, and Reaves appealed. Id. The First District Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Reaves' motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. Id. at 1070. This part of the decision is discussed infra, Section VII.
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Lack of Specificity in the Charging Document

In a case of first impression, the First District Court of Appeal addressed the question of whether a fundamental error amounting to a denial of
due process occurs when a charging document omits both: (1) The essential
elements of the offense allegedly committed by an accessory after the fact or
the principal, and (2) Any "reference to the statute that proscribes that offense."'340 In Baker v. State,34 the defendant's failure to preserve the issue at
trial meant that he could raise the error for the first time on appeal "only if it
constitutes 'fundamental error."' 342 However, the court identified a conflict
between the fundamental error exception to the contemporaneous objection
rule and the district courts' practice of following dictum from the Supreme
Court of Florida in State v. Gray.343 That dictum states that when a charging
document "completely fails to charge a crime," the ensuing conviction violates due process, "a defect that can be raised at any time-before trial, after
trial, on appeal, or by habeas corpus." 344 After reviewing the record, the appellate court found that Gray and its progeny did not apply here, because the
charging document adequately alleged the accessory's offense.34 5 Moreover,
because Baker not only "fully understood the charge against him, [but also]
was able to mount a defense to that charge ...the information was not fundamentally defective," and due process was not denied. 34 6 Nevertheless,
"because a broad reading of the dicta in Gray might be determined to lead to
the opposite result," the court certified the following question as one of great
public importance:
When charging the offense of accessory after the fact, does fundamental error occur if, although the indictment or information alleges the elements of the offense as set out in section 777.03 and
identifies the offense allegedly committed by the principal or accessory before the fact, it fails also either to allege the elements of
the offense allegedly committed by the principal or accessory before the fact, or to cite the statute that proscribes that offense? 347

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Baker v. State, 4 So. 3d 758, 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
4 So. 3d 758 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 760 (citing Jackson v. State, 983 So. 2d 562, 568 (Fla. 2008)).
Id. at 760-61; State v. Gray, 435 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1983).
Gray, 435 So. 2d at 818.
Baker, 4 So. 3d at 761.
Id.

Id.
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Nonexistent Crimes

Two district courts rendered decisions that reversed convictions for
In James v.
nonexistent crimes on the ground of fundamental error.'
349
a
concealed
weawith
"carrying
State, where the defendant was charged
pon by a convicted felon," the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that it
was fundamental error for the trial court to instruct the jury on the nonexis3 50
tent offense of "'possession of a concealed weapon by a convicted felon.'
The court's definitions for actual and constructive possession compounded
that error because those definitions were irrelevant to the offense charged. 35
The Fourth District reversed the conviction and sentence and "remand[ed]
for a new trial on the charged crime of carrying a concealed weapon by a
convicted felon., 352 Similarly, in Mathis v. State,353 the Third District Court
of Appeal held that it was fundamental error for the trial court to omit a necessary element from the jury instruction. 35 In this case, Mathis was
charged with "possession with intent to sell cocaine within 1000 feet of a
child care facility. '355 The jury instructions omitted the requirement that
possession be "with the intent to sell" the contraband, resulting in Mathis's
conviction of "simple possession of contraband within 1000 feet of a child
care facility. 356 As this was a nonexistent crime, the appellate court found
fundamental error and reduced the conviction to simple possession.357 Because the sentence imposed by the trial court fell within35 8the sentencing
guidelines for simple possession, no new trial was necessary
D.

Ex Post Facto Laws

During the survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida decided two
cases involving ex post facto challenges. 9 In Griffin v. State,36 the Court
348. See James v. State, 16 So. 3d 322, 325 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Mathis v. State,
21 So. 3d 865, 866 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
349. 16 So. 3d 322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
350. Id. at 325.

351.

Id. at 326.

352. Id. at 327.
353. 21 So. 3d 865 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
354. Id. at 866.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. Mathis, 21 So. 3d at 866.
359. See Griffin v. State, 980 So. 2d 1035, 1037 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam); Lescher v. Fla.
Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 985 So. 2d 1078, 1086 (Fla. 2008).
360. 980 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam).
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held that the prohibition against ex post facto laws was not violated by the
retroactive application of section 939.185 of the FloridaStatutes, which authorized costs to be assessed against a defendant whose conviction occurred
before the statute's enactment.36 On appeal from the trial court's order, the
Second District Court of Appeal reversed the imposition of costs and certified conflict with Ridgeway v. State,362 a First District Court of Appeal
case. 363 However, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the decision in
Ridgeway and adopted that opinion as its own. 3 4 In doing so, the Court applied a two-prong test to determine whether a measure constitutes a criminal
penalty, stating that a law violates the ex post facto clause if (1) it is retrospective in effect, and (2) it "alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty" imposed for the offense.3 65 The Court found that section
939.185 meets the first prong because it applies to offenses committed before
the statute's effective date.366 However, the statute fails to meet the second
prong because the imposition of costs "neither alters the definition of the
criminal conduct nor increases" the penalty for the crime.367 As such, section
939.185 does not constitute a criminal penalty and thus does not violate the
prohibition against ex post facto laws.368 Accordingly, the Court quashed
Griffin in part, approved Ridgeway, and remanded to the district court.369
In Lescher v. Florida Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 370 the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the question of whether the
prohibition against ex post facto laws was violated by a statutory amendment
eliminating hardship licenses for drivers whose licenses had been permanently revoked.371 In this case, after his fourth DUI conviction in 2000, Lescher's license was revoked pursuant to section 322.28(2)(e) of the FloridaStatutes.372 At the time of this revocation he could have applied for a hardship

361. Id. at 1037.
362. 892 So. 2d 538, 539-40 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the retroactive
application of section 939.185 did not violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws where
the defendant pled nolo contendere on the same day that the statute became effective).
363. Griffin, 980 So. 2d at 1036.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 1037; see FLA. STAT. § 939.185 (2004).
367. Griffin, 980 So. 2d at 1037.
368. Id.
369. Id., followed by Love v. State, 992 So. 2d 823, 824 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008),
cited by Broadnax v. State, 987 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
370. 985 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 2008).
371. Id.at 1079.
372. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 322.28(2)(e) (2000).
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license, under former section 322.271(4), but did not do so until 2005. 37 ' His
application was denied, and the denial was upheld by the circuit court.374
The Fourth District Court of Appeal then denied his petition for certiorari
and certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one
of great public importance: "Does the amendment to section 322.271(4),
FloridaStatutes, which eliminated hardship driver's licenses effective July 1,
2003, violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws as to persons who
could have
applied for a hardship license before the amendment became ef375
fective?,
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the certified question in the
negative and approved the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision.376 The
Court determined that the amendment eliminating hardship licenses imposed
a civil penalty, not criminal punishment. 377 The first step in this analysis was
to ascertain legislative intent, which the Court concluded was "to protect the
public through a regulatory regime governing driver's licenses. '37 8 The
second step was to determine the civil or criminal effect of the statute under
a seven-factor test. 379 Applying these factors, the Court concluded that
Lescher had failed to show that the provisions in question were so punitive
that they negated the legislature's intent of imposing a civil sanction. 380 As a
373. Lescher, 985 So. 2d at 1079-80; see FLA. STAT. § 322.271(4) (1997). The language
from that section permitting reinstatement after four DUI convictions had been eliminated by
chapter 98-223, section 9, Florida Laws, which later was held unconstitutional for violating
the single subject requirement in Article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution. Fla. Dep't
of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Critchfield, 842 So. 2d 782, 783 (Fla. 2003) (per
curiam); see FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6. The legislature cured the constitutional defect by reenacting the provision as an amendment to section 322.271(4), effective July 1, 2003. Critchfied, 842 So. 2d at 785. Thus, there was a window during which Lescher could have, but
did not, request a hardship license; but that period closed when the amendment was reenacted.
See Lescher, 985 So. 2d at 1080.
374. Lescher, 985 So. 2d at 1080.
375. See id. at 1080-81.
376. Id. at 1086.
377. Id.; see also Bolware v. State, 995 So. 2d 268, 275 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam). In Bolware, resolving a conflict among intermediate appellate courts, the Supreme Court of Florida
held that although the revocation of a driver's license is a personal hardship, it does not constitute "punishment." Bolware, 995 So. 2d at 275. Therefore, it is not a direct consequence of a
guilty plea and there is no requirement that defendant be informed in order for the plea to be
voluntary. Id. However, the Court also found that the suspension or revocation of a driver's
license constitutes such a serious consequence that a defendant should be informed of it during a plea colloquy. Id. at 276. The Court therefore directed that Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.172(c) be amended accordingly. Id.; see FLA. R. CRIMv. P. 3.172(c).
378. Lescher, 985 So. 2d at 1081-82.
379. Id. at 1082.
380. Id. at 1086.
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civil remedy, the elimination of the availability of hardship licenses from
section 322.271(4) for drivers with four DUI convictions did not constitute
an ex post facto law.381
E.

FederalPreemption

The Fifth District Court of Appeal decided a claim of federal preemption in Menefee v. State.382 This was an appeal from a judgment and sentence for the offense of misdemeanor stalking in violation of section
784.048(3).383 The defendant was accused of using his ham radio to make
repeated threats over the radio airwaves to kill the victim. 384 In a pretrial
motion to dismiss, Menefee argued that the State was preempted from prosecuting him because the federal government regulates ham radio broadcasts.385 After the trial court denied the motion, a jury found Menefee guilty
of misdemeanor stalking.386
On appeal of the denial of his motion to dismiss, Menefee argued that
licenced amateur radio communications were governed exclusively by federal law and that the State was therefore precluded by the Supremacy Clause of
388
387
The Fifth
the United States Constitution from regulating such matters.
District Court of Appeal rejected this argument on the ground that, in prosecuting Menefee, the State sought to punish him for criminal conduct, not "to
regulate the air waves. ' ' 389 The court could find no statutory language expressly or impliedly preempting the states from punishing individuals who
use the radio airways to harass a victim criminally.39 ° Moreover, the court
determined that the stalking statute was not enacted to regulate ham radio
operators but rather "to protect victims from intentional threatening conduct
that causes substantial emotional distress in the form of a reasonable fear for
one's safety., 391 Because the prosecution was not federally preempted, the
appellate court affirmed the judgment and sentence. 392

381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 322.271(4) (1998).
980 So. 2d 569, 570 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 570-71; see FLA. STAT. § 784.048(3) (2004).
Menefee, 980 So. 2d at 570-71.
Id. at 571.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Menefee, 980 So. 2d at 571.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id. at 574-75.
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Separationof Powers

The First District Court of Appeal addressed an issue involving invalid
rulemaking by the legislature.393 Formerly, Rule 3.250 of the Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure permitted a defendant to make the concluding argument to the jury if the only testimony offered by the defendant in his or her
behalf was the defendant's own. 3 Section 918.19 of the FloridaStatutes
repealed that part of Rule 3.250 relating to closing arguments and substituted
a different procedure that allowed the prosecutor to make the concluding
argument. 39 However, in Grice v. State,396 the First District Court of Appeal
found section 918.19 to be constitutionally infirm because its adoption of a
new procedural rule constituted invalid rulemaking by the legislature. 397 As
the repeal itself was constitutionally valid, the court examined the common
law to determine the proper procedure. 398 The common law rule provided
that the State was entitled to conduct initial and concluding closing arguments because the State carried the burden of proof.399 Because the trial
court's decision was correct but for the wrong reason, the appellate court
affirmed under the "tipsy coachman" rule. 4°°
VI.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

In Kasischke v. State,4°' the Supreme Court of Florida was called upon
to resolve a district split regarding interpretation of a statute prohibiting sexual offenders from possessing pornography. 4°2 The statute in question provided that sexual offenders sentenced to probation or community control
would be prohibited from "'viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene,
pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including
telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that

393. See Grice v. State, 967 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla.1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
394. Id. at 959.
395. Id.; see FLA. STAT. §918.19 (2006); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.250 (2006) (amended 2007).
396. 967 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
397. Id. at 961 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 918.19 (2006)).
398. Grice, 967 So. 2d at 961.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 961-62 (citing Robertson v. State, 829 So. 2d 901, 906-07 (Fla. 2002)). In
Robertson v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida explained the "tipsy coachman" doctrine as
"allow[ing] an appellate court to affirm a trial court that 'reaches the right result, but for the
wrong reasons' so long as 'there is any basis which would support the judgment in the
record."' Robertson, 829 So. 2d at 906.
401. 991 So. 2d 803 (Fla.2008).
402. Id. at 805.
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are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern."'" 3 The issue was
whether this section enacted a complete ban against all pornographic material or only those materials that are "relevant to the offender's deviant behavior."' The Court agreed with the district court in that the plain language of
the statute was ambiguous because it was "susceptible to multiple and irreconcilable interpretations" as to which prohibited materials had to be relevant to the defendant's deviant conduct.4" 5 After examining several rules of
statutory construction, the Court applied the rule of lenity and held that the
qualifying language relating to relevance qualifies each of the prohibitions in
the statute. 4°6 Thus, an offender does not violate the statute unless the "'obstimulating material"' at issue is "relevant
scene, pornographic, or sexually
''4 7
to 'deviant behavior pattern. 0
In a case of first impression, the Second District Court of Appeal considered whether the language "willfully and unlawfully cage a child," as contained in the aggravated child abuse statute, encompassed the defendant's
"act of chaining his sixteen-year-old stepson at [his] place of work and in the
stepson's bedroom., 40 8 In Blow v. State,' the court held that the plain
meaning of the statutory language limits its application to confinement "in
410
some type of wire or bar boxlike structure or a small restrictive enclosure.
In support of this conclusion, the court noted, "The noun 'cage' is defined as
'a box or enclosure having some openwork, (as of wires or bars),
esp[ecially] for confining or carrying birds or animals,' [while] the verb
'cage' is defined as . . . 'confine, shut in, keep in or as if in a cage' and 'enclose in or with a strong structure to prevent escape. ' ' 4 1 Because "[t]he
plain meaning of the term 'cage' does not include the act of chaining or
handcuffing," the court found that the State had not presented a prima facie
case of aggravated child abuse by caging.412

Id. at 805-06 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5)(a)7 (1999) (amended 2000).
Kasischke, 991 So. 2d at 805.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 815.
Id.
Blow v. State, 993 So. 2d 540, 540-41 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007), overruled in
M.N. v. State, 16 So. 3d 280, 282 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (en banc) (citing FLA.
STAT. § 827.03(2) (2005)).
409. 993 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007), overruled in part by M.N. v. State, 16
So. 3d 280, 282 (Fla.2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (en banc).
410. Id. at 541.
411. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 313
(1986)).
412. Id. at 542.

403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
part by
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In Duan v. Stte,413 the defendant appealed his conviction for extortion
on the ground that the victim's mental injury failed to satisfy the elements of
that offense.4" 4 Duan's conviction rested on his threat to testify falsely in
order to extort money from the victim.4"' The extortion statute prohibits
communication that "maliciously threatens an injury to the person, property
or reputation of another" for the purpose of compelling that person to act or
to refrain from acting "against his or her will."4'16 The issue on appeal was
whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the extortion statute
encompassed threats to a person's mental well-being and did not require
physical injury.417 Affirming Duan's conviction, the First District Court of
Appeal found that the language of the statute itself suggests the Legislature
intended to criminalize threats to mental or emotional well-being. 4 8 For
example, section 836.05 expressly prohibits threats to reveal private secrets,
or divulge information that "would damage the victim's reputation, or...
expose the victim to disgrace. ' 41' 9 Such threats, if carried out, could "cause
the victim mental or emotional stress. 42 ° Moreover, because "the phrase
'injury to the person' is not further modified as a 'bodily injury' or 'physical
injury,"' it includes "both physical and mental injuries. 4 2 ' Thus, the appellate court held that, as a matter of apparent first impression in Florida, the
extortion statute prohibits threats to cause mental or psychological injuries.422
The question facing the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Beam v.
4 23
State was whether an uncle by marriage could be convicted of incest involving a niece whom he had adopted.424 The court held that he could not.42 5
In support of this conclusion, the court examined the plain language of the
incest statutes, holding that it limits the legal definition of incest to persons
who are related by consanguinity.426 Because the definition did not include
relationships of affinity and adoption, and because Beam did not have the
requisite biological relationship with his victim, the court reversed in part,
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

970 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
Id. at 905.

Id.
Id. at 906 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 836.05 (2006)).
Duan, 970 So. 2d at 906.
Id. at908.
Id. at 907.
Id.

Id.
Duan, 970 So. 2d at 907-08.
1 So. 3d 331 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 331-32.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 332-33.
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remanded, and directed the trial court to vacate Beam's conviction for incest.427
VII. MISCELLANEOUS

The issue of parental kidnapping was the subject of the Third District
Court of Appeal's decision in Davila v. State.428 The defendant was convicted of three counts of kidnapping, among other charges. 429 Davila appealed the denial of his motion for post conviction relief under Rule 3.850 of
the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. 430 He argued that the three counts
of kidnapping should be vacated because, as the victim's parent, it was impossible for him to kidnap his own child.43' The Third District Court of Appeal rejected this argument.432 The court recognized the general rule that "a
parent cannot be convicted of kidnapping his own child" when there is no
court order awarding custody to the parent from whom the child was taken. 433
However, the court relied on its own judicial exception to the statutory
rule.434 Under this exception, a parent can be convicted of kidnapping when
the defendant "'does not simply exercise his rights to the child, but takes her
for an ulterior and unlawful purpose which is specifically forbidden by the
kidnapping statute itself.' ' 435 Denying the requested relief, the court acknowledged that this exception was at variance with the Second District
Court of Appeal's holding in Muniz v. State436 and certified conflict.437
The First District Court of Appeal resolved a question of causation in a
drag-racing case.438 In Reaves v. State,439 the defendant sought to withdraw
427. Id. at 334-35. The court affirmed, without discussion, Beam's conviction and sentence for the offense of sexual battery upon a person over the age of twelve by use of threats
of retaliation. Beam, 1 So. 3d at 331.
428. 26 So. 3d 5, 6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009), reh'g granted, 36 So. 3d 83 (Fla. 2010).
429. Id. at 6.
430. Id.; see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.850 (specifying the grounds constituting claims for
post-conviction relief).
431. Davila, 26 So. 3d at 7.
432. See id.
433. Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 637 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).

434. Id.
435. Id. (quoting Lafleur v. State, 661 So. 2d 346, 349 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
436. 764 So. 2d 729, 729 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that when a parent or legal
guardian confines a child under the age of thirteen, no crime is committed under the kidnapping statute unless a court order has deprived the parent or legal guardian of authority over
that child. ).
437. Davila, 26 So. 3d at 7.
438. Reaves v.State, 979 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
439. 979 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam).
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his plea of guilty to vehicular homicide." In support of his argument that he
had not caused the victim's death, he proffered two alternate theories. 441
First, he suggested that the victim, a passenger in the other car, had caused
her own death because she participated voluntarily in the race." 2 Second, he
claimed that the other racer, Street, was the sole proximate cause of the passenger's death because he refused to decelerate and merge upon approaching
the median." 3
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Reaves' motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.444 The court rejected his first theory based on the rule that "[c]ases
where the decedent is held responsible involve circumstances where the deceased's conduct alone led to his or her death." 445 In this case, there was no
evidence that the passenger had "played an active role in the race, or...
even acquiesced to Street's decision to participate in the race."' Without
evidence that the passenger's conduct was the singular cause of the accident
the court held that she was not the proximate cause of her own death." 7 The
court also rejected the second theory of causation on the ground that it was
natural and foreseeable that Street would accelerate and attempt to pass
Reaves. 44' Moreover, the evidence showed that Reaves refused to allow the
other vehicle to merge as both cars approached the median."49 Thus, both
drivers were the proximate cause of the victim's death. 40
VIII.

CONCLUSION

During the survey period, the Supreme Court of the United States
rendered an important decision in Graham, concerning the punishment of
juvenile, non-homicide offenders in Florida.45' At the same time, the Supreme Court of Florida settled several conflicts among Florida's District
Courts of Appeal and interpreted a number of statutes, defenses, common

440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.

Id. at 1069.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Reaves, 979 So. 2d at 1070.
Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1070.
Id.
Id.
Reaves, 979 So. 2d at 1070.
See id.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
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law doctrines, and constitutional principles.452 Some of these decisions, including Montgomery,453 concerning the element of intent in the offense of
manslaughter by act, raised as many issues as they resolved. Florida's District Courts of Appeal were active as well, certifying several conflicts and
questions of great public importance to the Supreme Court of Florida.454

452. See, e.g., Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 2008); Lescher v. Fla. Dep't of
Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 985 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 2008); Griffin v. State, 980 So. 2d
1035 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam).
453. State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010).
454. See, e.g., Rosa v. State, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1361 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 18, 2010);
Williams v. State, 40 So. 3d 72 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Coicou 1, 867 So. 2d 409 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
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